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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTITIONERS
In Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment,' the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment (BZA) has the authority and obligation to assure adherence to
professional standards of conduct by attorneys practicing before it, even in
the absence of specific rules governing those who practice before it. The
court added that the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility should guide the Board in these circumstances. Here the issue
was one of attorney conflict of interest.
At a hearing for a special exception to increase the number of off-street
parking spaces at Westbridge, a proposed residential and commercial com-
plex, the petitioner moved that applicant's counsel, the firm of Wilkes and
Artis, be disqualified. The petitioner objected because two members of the
firm had earlier participated in a related matter opposing the applicant
while serving in the District of Columbia's office of Corporation Counsel.
The Chairman of the BZA denied petitioner's request to disqualify Wilkes
and Artis on the ground that the BZA was not a proper forum to raise this
alleged violation.
The Court of Appeals rejected the Chairman's conclusion, stating that
BZA has not only the authority, but also the responsibility, to regulate
practice before it. The case was therefore remanded with instructions that,
if either ex-government attorney was found to have violated the "revolving
door" rule by appearing in a matter on which he previously worked while
employed by the government, he should be disqualified from appearing in
the matter before the Zoning Board.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER-PUBLICATION
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in People's Counsel of the
District of Columbia v. Public Service Commission,2 determined that "pub-
lication" of a Public Service Commission (PSC) order occurs when the
PSC releases the full written text of its order, and not when it recites its
decision at a "sunshine" hearing.
1. 413 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 1980).
2. 414 A.2d 520 (D.C. 1980) (per curiam).
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Potomac Electric Power Company (Pepco) filed an application for a rate
increase with the PSC. After oral argument on Pepco's application, the
Commission held a "sunshine hearing" on June 29, 1979, to announce its
final decision. On July 18, 1979, the PSC released a printed copy of its
final order. On August 17, the petitioner filed an application for reconsid-
eration of the Commission's decision. Pepco moved to have the applica-
tion dismissed for late filing.
To preserve a right of appeal, a party must apply for reconsideration
within thirty days after "publication" of a final PSC order.3 The word
"publication" had never been defined by PSC rules nor addressed specifi-
cally in previous cases. The court reasoned that publication occurred upon
the release of the written text of the final order rather than at the sunshine
hearing. In the release, the PSC elaborated fully on its reasoning in sup-
port of the order. On the other hand, at the hearing, the PSC had merely
expressed its views. The application for reconsideration, filed within thirty
days of release of the text, therefore, was timely filed.
Ili. BASIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Washington Ethical Soci-
ety v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment,4 overturned the
Board's refusal to grant a special exception for increased enrollment at
Washington Ethical Society School, a private school. To receive such an
exception under District of Columbia law,5 a private school must establish
that it will not become "objectionable" to adjacent property because of
noise and traffic, and that ample 'parking places exist for the additional
students. According to the court, the Board's finding that an additional
fifteen students would make the school "objectionable" was inadequate
and not supported by the record.6 Thus it remanded the case, instructing
the Zoning Board to grant the application if the applicant could make the
necessary showing under the applicable law on special exceptions.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER-AUTHORITY TO REVOKE RECUSAL
In Morrison v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment,' the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision to
3. D.C. CODE § 43-704 (1973).
4. 421 A.2d 14 (D.C. 1980).
5. D.C. Zoning Regulation § 3101.42 (1980).
6. D.C. CODE § 1-1509(e) (Supp. V 1978).
7. 422 A.2d 347 (D.C. 1980).
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grant a variance to permit respondent's construction of an office building.
The Chairman of the Zoning Board had initially recused himself from the
case because he was a private attorney in an unrelated case opposing one
of the partners of the applicant for the variance. Subsequently, he revoked
his recusal and considered the variance request because the other litigation
had been resolved.
The petitioners contended that, although the reason for his recusal had
been removed, the Chairman had no authority to revoke his recusal and
participate in the case. The court did not agree, finding that such a change
in circumstances may justify a revocation, provided that the record con-
tains sufficient evidence of the change in circumstances to guard against
prejudice, bias, or interest on the part of a member of the administrative
agency.
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